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Extant literature informs that the modern state requires a civil service whose performance 
is accurately measured, evaluated and subsequently rewarded (or punished).  In this paper we 
use Pakistan as a case study of a country in which the performance evaluation system is 
obsolete and resistant to change.  After analysing literature on the importance of performance 
management systems in bureaucracies, we evaluate the present structure of the Pakistani 
performance evaluation system of civil servants and identify its major weaknesses. We then 
present the results of a unique survey of senior civil servants which informs on how they 
viewed potential reforms of the current system.  Based on this, we present a revised instrument 
to more accurately measure the performance of Pakistani civil servants, which both adapts the 
existing instrument while being cognizant of the international best practices.  Finally we look 
at some of the significant political economy factors that could hinder the introduction of a new 
performance management system. 
Keywords: Performance Evaluation, Political Manipulation, SMART, Political 
Alignment Performance Management, Civil Service 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although there is exists debate about the role and importance of the nation-state 
there is no question that at an efficient and meritocratic civil service is a key arm of the 
state [Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2014)] “The importance of the bureaus and the 
critical position of their heads in the line of command need no demonstration” 
[Macmahon and Millet (1939: 307)]. 
Also, there has been a strong move recently to move from a civil service that is blindly 
trusted to maximise societal welfare to a civil service whose performance is accurately 
measured, evaluated and rewarded (or punished).  Though this approach is intuitively 
appealing, there are significant problems in adopting such a system for many reasons: first, 
there is always a fluid definition of performance and this definition is highly subject to 
interpretation. Second, there is a tendency to delay change in developing countries especially 
since the civil service is viewed as a relatively stable force in turbulent times (even in the case 
where the civil service is viewed as flawed). And third, there is always significant resistance to 
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changing the system of rewards and punishments for the civil service and those that tend to 
resist these changes most are the civil servants themselves as well as the politicians and other 
stakeholders.  But in a rapidly changing world, a civil service in which performance is not 
measured, evaluated and rewarded accurately will become obsolete.   
This research is focused on the Pakistani performance evaluation system and the 
reason for this is multi-fold: First, the Pakistani case is a perfect example of a 
bureaucratic performance management system that is in need of significant reform, not 
only because of the significant increase in the scale of responsibilities of the bureaucrats 
but also because the present system has effectively broken down which makes it a 
enlightening case study in the developing country context. Second, the system has now 
come to the point where the various powerful stakeholders (such as the political elite and 
the business community) have effectively dismantled the bureaucratic system to suit their 
own needs which has led to bureaucratic decisions being made for the benefit of a few as 
opposed to benefit of all the stakeholders in society. Finally, the bureaucrats themselves 
recognise that the system is broken which means that if reforms are not begun the system 
could effectively collapse. The objective of the research therefore is to understand the 
many different ways the performance evaluation system in Pakistan has broken down and 
the best way forward, within the current political economy constraints to fix it.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section II we look at the literature on 
the importance of performance management systems in bureaucracies and then focus on 
the experiences of developing countries in reforming the performance management 
systems of their bureaucracies.  In Section III we discuss the present structure of the 
present performance evaluation system of bureaucrats and identify its major weaknesses. 
In Section IV we present a revised instrument to measure the performance of Pakistani 
civil servants which adapts the existing instrument keeping in mind international best 
practices.  In Section V we present some of the results of a unique survey of senior 
bureaucrats (from the Pakistan civil service) which looked at how they viewed potential 
reforms of the current system. In Section VI we discuss some of the significant political 
economy issues that could occur while trying to introduce a new performance 
management system for bureaucrats.  
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Though one cannot deny the importance of markets, literature confirms that the 
state still has an important role to play in the ensuring development of countries, 
especially in developing countries. The state and the way it governs has significant 
implications in the developing country context.  The modern state is issued with the 
responsibility of providing governance and directing development.  “As world economic 
integration proceeds, state capabilities will matter more rather than less in fostering social 
well-being and wealth creation” [Weiss (1998)].  State and Effective government 
performance and management are quintessential for state development [Hilderbrand and 
Grindle (1997)].  States which are unable to deliver efficient governance and public 
service provision will fade as the new globalised era belongs to the competent states 
[Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2014)] Subsequently the importance an effective public 
administration, which is the primary vehicle through which the state ensures public 
service delivery and economic development, cannot be over emphasised.   
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The major causes of economic growth in the third world, investigated by Reynolds 
(1983) based on the historical experience of 41 countries since mid-nineteenth century; 
show that administrative competence is of paramount importance for economic growth of 
a country: 
“My hypothesis is that the single most important explanatory variable is political 
organisation and the administrative competence of government” [Reynolds 
(1983:976)]. 
Literature informs that “The vitality of a country‟s development depends on the 
rejuvenation of public administration even in the darkness of insufficient knowledge and 
experience [Rizos (1965: 47)]. And a modern competent state requires efficient and 
committed bureaucracies [Weiss (1998)]. Recent development literature emphasises the 
importance of a competent and professional bureaucrat, and informs that efficient 
performance of the civil servant has a direct correlation with development [Kohli (2006)]. 
Evans (1995) confirms that the primary instrument of the developmental states remains a 
competent and a professional bureaucracy. The miracle of the East Asian developmental 
state has largely been attributed to the role of the professional and autonomous 
bureaucracy, which closely approximate the Weberian model [Chang (2006)]. There are 
now both case studies and cross-country empirical analyses that affirm that bureaucratic 
performance is essential for development performance [Kaufmann, et al. (2000); Evans 
and Rauch (1999, 2000); World Bank (1997)]. 
After establishing the importance of the bureaucracy, the following section 
inspects the reasons why performance management systems are essential for the 
development of an effective bureaucracy. It is because the ability of the bureaucrat to 
transform the tenets of policy into the reality of development is dependent on the 
capability and capacity of the bureaucracy as an organisation to ensure successful 
delivery of programmes and projects. The quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, the 
incentives offered to the bureaucracy, and the credibility of the bureaucrat‟s commitment 
to policies all impact on the quality of governance.  
Underlining the significance of the efficiently performing bureaucrat and the close 
correlation to positive development outcomes, governments and practitioners have turned 
their attention towards augmenting the capacity of the bureaucrat [Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1996);  Pollitt  and Bouckaert (2000); 
Ayee  (2008)].  This is more important than ever before, as with the 21st century, the 
forces of globalisation, and increasing volatility and irregularity within the social and 
economic environment, has called for the civil service, particularly the senior civil 
service to realign and reinvent itself to cope with the evolving strategic challenges. In this 
process of reinvention and modernisation of the senior bureaucracy, modernising the 
evaluation and performance management of the civil servants is vital.  
A sound performance management system is essential to the civil service remains 
efficient and motivated. Bana and McCourt (2006) examine Tanzania‟s civil service and 
report excessive political appointments and promotions. They inform that depolarisation 
of the bureaucracy and its reform, especially of its performance appraisal will translate it 
good governance.  This has been corroborated by Rugumyamheto (2004) who inspects 
52 Tanwir and Chaudhry 
public service reform in Tanzania and informs that the importance of political leadership 
and commitment for successful reform cannot be overemphasised to ensure governance 
and development.   
The performance must be assessed accurately, as Garvin (1993) informs that “if 
you cannot measure it, you cannot manage it”. And it is important to measure accurately 
and objectively, as Daniels (1987) apprises “anything can be measured and if it can be 
measured it can be improved”.  Accurate performance measurement tools would indicate 
whether the work rendered is satisfactory or provide warnings if the work is inadequate. 
Accurate and objective performance measurement would also lend clarity when 
examining the cause of the success or failure of development programmes performance 
management can also provide indications to what may be the problem, whether it is the 
performance of the bureaucrats or other extraneous factors which need consideration. 
Accurate measurement can also isolate the officers which need to improve performance 
and would also help strengthen accountability, transparency, improve quality of service, 
and culminate more successful outcomes [Cook, et al. (1995)].  Performance 
management system which has incentives that motivate and influence public sector 




III.  THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE OF REFORM 
Literature informs that developing countries are now overhauling their public 
administration and performance management systems to keep up with the challenges of 
the modern global economy.  
The following section examines the CSR initiates in Africa. The Economic 
Commission for Africa report apprises on the reform initiatives undertaken in Africa 
regarding the civil service. It examines four Case studies: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and 
South Africa. The report informs that in these countries the civil service reform efforts 
started in the late 1980s, and the reforms were ushered by the onset of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and the New Public Management (NPM).
2
 The 
emphasis of the reform was to augment the efficiency and performance of the civil 
servant. Some of the principle strategies deployed by the civil service reform were 
restructuring of the organisation, improving human resource management, reinventing 
the relationships between ministers and civil servants, and augmenting capacity of the 
civil service through training of staff and retaining them. There was a focus on 
incentivising performance of the officers. The report informs that some progress was 
noted the four countries in terms of innovations and best practices in civil service reforms 
(CSRs). And some of these were “performance management agreements with senior civil 
servants; and annual civil service monitoring and evaluation”.   
Court, Kristen, and Weder (1999) examine the results of a survey on incentives 
and bureaucratic structures in Africa. Their research suggests that incentive structures 
 
1An incentive implies a positive motivation to perform efficiently, and give the best performance 
possible. Mathauer and Imhoff (2006:3) understand the term motivation as “the willingness to exert and 
maintain an effort towards organisational goals”. 
2For detailed information on the case studies please see Economic Commission for Africa (ECA): 
Innovations and Best Practices in Public Sector Reforms: The Case of Civil Service in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria 
and South Africa, December 2010. 
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play comparable roles in African countries and improved performance of the officers 
remains linked to organisational autonomy and good career opportunities. Their research 
endorses that incentives play a significant role in augmenting civil service performance.  
Mugerwa (2003) examines five case studies (French-speaking West Africa, 
Malawi, Kenya, Nigeria and Mozambique) regarding the civil service reform efforts, the 
contents and the impact. They find that both the incentives and the structures prevalent 
were inadequate. In their research they inform that an efficient, productive and 
accountable civil service remains premised on competitive compensation and 
performance-based promotion. 
Mengesha and Common (2007) assess the outcomes of the Public Sector Capacity 
reform, based on a small-scale survey conducted in two ministries. The results of the 
survey informs that there was notable transformation in the quality of service delivery in 
the ministries. A significant improvement in performance was observed. The reform was 
gradual but eventually translated into significant improvements in Ethiopia‟s system of 
public administration. The research suggests that to ensure the positive sustainable impact 
of the reform, there should be permanent incentive schemes and a proper monitoring 
system. It informs that even though many public sector reforms fail in African countries, 
there are cases where reforms have translated into positive outcomes. 
There have been similar initiatives in other countries: There have been efforts to 
reform the civil service in China since the 1980s. Burns (2007) informs that since 1993 
the Chinese government has prioritised on the reform of the country‟s civil service 
system, where “performance appraisals focus mostly on merit-related criteria which seek 
to evaluate behaviour on the job.  China‟s performance management policy seeks to link 
performance with rewards and stipulates the payment of bonuses to those who have 
performed well. It also mandates that bonuses should be linked to those officers who 
receive outstanding appraisals [Burns (2007: 15)]” The reforms improve the monitoring 
and supervision systems. The incentives were instrumental in ensuring augmented 
performance. The research confirms that the reforms augmented the performance of the 
civil servants; however the full impact of the reforms was weakened by a failure to 
redress impediments present in the organisation culture in china.  
Civil service reforms do translate into efficient performance. However developing 
countries lack the mechanisms required to implement and sustain the civil service 
reforms.  Literature informs that even though incentives play a determining role in 
boosting performance of the public officials, however developing countries lack the 
mechanisms that ensure that the incentives successfully motivate the public service 
officials. [Lopes and Theisohn (2004:99)]. However in their research Lopes and Theisohn 
(2004) examine various countries case studies to examine if incentives have indeed 
translated into capacity development, and they find that in the case of India the use of 
better management evaluation and assessments translated into enhanced performance of 
the civil servants. They report similar success full results of CSR in Philippines. 
 
IV.  AN ANALYSIS OF THE PAKISTAN’S PRESENT PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Before presenting a revised version of the PER, the following section offers some 
insights in to the current PER prevalent in Pakistan. At present, Pakistan does not have a 
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performance management system. It only has one performance evaluation report (PER). 
The PER (previously termed as the annual confidential report (ACR)) is filled out 
annually by the senior/boss of the officer being assessed and is one of the most important 
criteria for assessing whether the officer is worthy of being promoted to a higher grade or 
not.  
This performance assessment document according to Weber (1968) should be 
based on merit and performance. According to Weberian Tradition the PER should be an 
objective and fair assessment of the officer concerned, and it should recommend a 
promotion to a higher grade if the performance warrants it. If promotion is lacking, or 
further capacity building of the officer is required then it should report these facts 
accurately also.  However it is reported that the Pakistani ACR reports “rarely contain 
adverse remarks since there are doubts about their confidentiality”; the report does not 
have tangible, performance-oriented criteria and is premised heavily on subjective 
evaluations of officers‟ characters [Tanwir (2010)]. Moreover, the comments are very 
general and simplistic and completely devoid of performance-related targets [Tanwir 
(2010)]. The National Commission for governance reforms in Pakistan informs that the 
performance evaluation reports in Pakistan are subjective and are frequently used as 
punishment by superiors to ensure submissiveness.  
Recent research focusing on the civil service of Pakistan, offers an in depth 
analyses of the structure and functioning (or the lack of) of Pakistan‟s bureaucracy and 
one of the critical issues brought to light is the lack of objective performance assessing 
standards for the officers. Its key recommendation to the government of Pakistan is to 
reinvent the current PER reports by using objective performance-oriented criteria, and 
doing away with the current subjective evaluation.  The report informs that the current 
system remains non-meritocratic and the transfers and the promotions are based on 
political alignment and not on merit and performance.  
This is a demotivating factor for the officers. Research on the general performance 
appraisal systems in Pakistan by Usman, et al. (2014) finds that fairness perception and 
grievance mechanism are the most important predictors of performance appraisal 
satisfaction. And fulfilment of training and development needs and feedback were 
important predictors of work motivation. The research highlights the importance of an 
effective performance management system. Similar research in the telecom industry by 
Malik and Aslam (2013) in Pakistan confirms that perceived fairness is found as critically 
important dimension of performance appraisal for employee motivation. These 
ingredients remain missing in the performance evaluation report of the bureaucrats in the 
Pakistani context. 
The World Bank civil services reform document (1998) also reflects the 
disconnection between performance and promotion in the Pakistani bureaucracy. The 
system appears to have been degenerated into one of promotion purely on the basis of 
seniority, which is a source of significant staff de-motivation there does not exist a 
connection between performance and career advancement.  
The inadequacy of the ACR in gauging performance is confirmed by Cheema and 
Sayeed (2006) who report that the ACR emphasises the personal qualities of the officer 
rather than to setting objective and measurable targets against which performance can be 
assessed. It appears that performance and ACR have little correlation. India and Pakistan 
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both inherited the same British Weberian model, and have the same ACR system to 
gauge promotion and performance. Kashikar (2012) on evaluating the performance 
appraisal system in the Indian bureaucracy, informs that the system of performance 
appraisal in India, the PER, remains a tool of control, a legacy of the British rule. It does 
not have a developmental orientation, and suffers from similar ailments as the Pakistani 
PER, and has no quantifiable targets and objective standards, and remains susceptible to 
political manipulation. To add further strength to the argument, the quantitative study by 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics [Haque (2007)], elaborates on the 
perceptions of the bureaucrats, that their postings and transfers are not done on the basis 
of who is the most pertinent and able for the position but on other grounds.   It seems that 
transfers are certainly not being made for efficiency reasons. In keeping with the 
observations of several authors, it seems that rationale for these decisions is a 
combination of political pressure and rent sharing. [Haque (2007)]. 
Additionally the concept of promotion on merit and performance is difficult to 
quantify in the Pakistani bureaucracy as the bureaucrats are not usually given any goals 
or deadlines to meet. As elaborated in the Haque (2007) report, that the need for a clear 
job description is mandatory for effective management and performance. And without a 
job description, the performance cannot be effectively assessed and hence merit and 
reward system cannot be established. Haque (2007) reports that only 60 percent of the 
civil servants have their job descriptions clearly articulated to them. The remaining 40 
percent reiterate they do not have a written job description. Without a proper job 
description accurate performance assessment cannot be ascertained. 
 
The Pakistani PER in Detail  
Unlike the best practices observed in International performance management 
systems the PER in Pakistan does not contain any explicit quantifiable targets. There is 
only an annual review, no review of agreement of targets beforehand, and no review of 
the attainment of targets/deliverables.  The Pakistani PER in its present form contains 
three particular sections: First, there is a section that asks the evaluator the basic 
information regarding the civil servant. Second there is a section that asks the evaluator 
about the basic job description of the civil servant as well as an account of his or her 
performance on the job. Third there is a section that asks for an evaluation of the civil 
servant‟s performance in their job as well as an evaluation of their strengths and 
weaknesses. It is useful to look at a detailed breakdown of each section in order to 
determine how the document can be improved upon.  The Pakistani performance 
evaluation report is given in the Appendix.   
In Section 1, the Pakistani performance evaluation system asks for the basic 
information of the civil servant like the name and date of birth of the civil servant, the 
ministry, division and department in which the civil servant is presently employed, the 
period under review, the date of entry into the civil service, the various jobs held during 
the period, the academic qualifications of the civil servant, the languages the civil servant 
knows, the training received by the civil servant and the period the civil servant served in 
their present job.  As a whole, most of this information is made up of basic facts which do 
not tend to be subject to manipulation or political interference.  But a few things should 
be noted:   First, knowledge of languages may be more important for some services than 
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others. So while noting it can be of some use in determining future jobs, it should not be 
used to limit the job opportunities of civil servants. Also it is important to realise relevant 
technical skills can be just as important as the knowledge of certain languages in some 
jobs (such as computer skills, programming skills, finance skills, etc.) and should also be 
included in the evaluation. 
In Section 2, a very brief job description is asked for as well as a brief account of 
the performance of the civil servant, which can be supported by giving targets and 
performance measures.  This is the first place where significant changes need to be made 
to the performance review.  First, the simple job description has to be replaced by a set of 
clear, concise and concrete job objectives and the estimated timelines associated with 
each objective.  This first step is the critical step needed to change the nature of the 
Pakistani performance review.  The performance appraisal that follows in this section is 
the most important aspect of the performance evaluation. It should list next to each of the 
objectives and timelines mentioned above how much progress has been made in meeting 
these clear objectives in the planned timelines.  It is critical that this be clearly done on an 
objective scale (either numerical on otherwise).   
At this stage it is important to note that a true performance evaluation review can 
only come after a discussion has been had between a civil servant and their superior 
before the review period begins on what are the clear and measureable objectives during 
the review period. So, Section 1 and Section 2 should be combined also completed at the 
beginning of the review period and should list a clear set of concrete and measureable 
objectives and the timelines associated which each objective.   
In Section 3, the evaluator comments on the performance of the civil servant in 
this particular position as well as their level of integrity as well as a picture of their 
strengths and weaknesses.  Though the heart of the present performance evaluation 
system, this is also the weakest part for a number of reasons: First, in the present 
evaluation report there is no link between evaluating performance and how well the civil 
servant has met the objectives decided up earlier. Second, measuring the integrity, 
emotional stability, and interpersonal skills of a civil servant are extremely subjective and 
highly susceptible to personal interpretation as well as manipulation.  In this case it 
would be far better to measure how specific related skills (such as management skills, 
communication skills, financial skills, etc.) have impacted the success or failure of a civil 
servant in meeting the objectives defined above.  Also, the questions on civil servant 
expertise and the training and development needs of the civil servant should be directly 
related to the ratings given above. So if a civil servant lacks certain language or technical 
skills then the training and development needs should be focused on developing these 
skills. Also, any discussion of technical expertise and suggestions for future postings 
should be based on the strengths of the civil servants as clearly illuminated in the sections 
above.   
 
V.  WHAT BUREAUCRATS PERCEIVE AS THE ROAD AHEAD 
To determine the true efficacy of the Pakistan performance evaluation system, and 
evaluate the extent to which it accurately captures the performance of the bureaucrats we 
also conducted a survey in which senior civil servants were asked about their perceptions 
regarding the present system.  
 Reforming a Broken System  57 
 
 
The performance of the bureaucrats has often been examined and berated by not 
only academics but by politicians, civilians and the international development agencies. 
There has been little research done which asks the bureaucrats about what the primary 
impediment is to their effective performance. Their own perceptions are valuable, 
because they are the true judges of what motivates their performance and what 
demoralises them and proves to be an impediment to their performance. And a research 
and a system based on their own personal feedback would have a much greater chance of 
success, than any other system imposed on them externally.   
In order to determine the perceptions of senior Civil Servants in Punjab regarding 
the present performance evaluation system we developed and administered a detailed 
questionnaire for senior civil servants. The questionnaire was informed by the 
comparison and contrasts   of the British and Pakistani performance evaluation system.  
More than 100 senior civil servants were surveyed to determine their perceptions 
regarding the efficacy of the present system as well as their recommendations for 
restructuring the present system. The survey was carried out in at the National Institute of 
Public Administration (NIPA), Lahore with a group of senior civil servants who were 
attending training courses at the institute.  The survey was unique as it was conducted for 
civil servants from a variety of services.   
The survey inquired about the strength and weakness of the system. It also asked 
about international best practices that could be included in the future performance 
evaluation system. The survey also gathered the perceptions of the bureaucrats about 
what they though the PER should contain for it to be a motivator and incentive for their 
bureaucratic performance.  It asked about the nature of the targets set in the system, the 
possibility of a link between efficiency and postings, and the link between performance, 
training and pay structures. 
The first set of results from the survey found an extremely negative perception of 
the current performance evaluation system. In particular a extremely high percentage of 
civil servants found the current PER to be extremely inaccurate in measuring 
performance, extremely susceptible to political manipulation and completely delinked 
from key motivational issues such as training opportunities, better positions, better 
salaries and overall motivation.  Finally the results showed that the civil servants found 
that the structure of the present PER lacked any objective criteria or targets. Some of the 
key results of the survey were: 
(1) 78 percent of the civil servants agreed that there was no link between 
efficient performance and the present performance evaluation system.   
(2) 70 percent of the civil servants confirmed that there was no link between 
efficient performance and training opportunities. 
(3) 84 percent of the civil servants confirmed that there was no link between 
efficient performance and better/plum postings. 
(4) 70 percent of the civil servants said there was no link between efficient 
performance and pay. 
(5) 70 percent of the civil servants thought the PER was subjective and lacked 
tangible objective criteria.  
(6) 99 percent of the civil servants confirmed that no targets were agreed 
between the officer and the senior manager for public service delivery. 
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(7) 70 percent of civil servants confirmed that the current PER was highly 
susceptible to political manipulation. 
(8) 85 percent of the civil servants perceived the current performance evaluation 
report (PER) to be inaccurate in assessing their performance.  
(9) 81 percent of the civil servants perceived that the PER was not a motivator 
for their performance. 
The second set of results of the survey showed that the civil servants were strongly 
in favour of a new performance management system that has quantifiable targets, that 
cannot be politically manipulated, that has SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, 
relevant, timed) objectives, that looks at what targets were achieved and how they were 
achieved, that is performed at least biannually and should be based on the evaluations of 
both people directly above and below the civil servant. Some of the key results from this 
section of the survey were: 
(1) 71 percent of officers concurred that Pakistan should have an umbrella PMS 
that links the PER (which is now in isolation) to the overall management of 
the bureaucrats and the organisation. 
(2) 90 percent of the civil servants said that there should be quantifiable targets 
in the PER.   
(3) 95 percent of the civil servants confirmed that there can be objective criteria 
in the PER which cannot be politically manipulated. 
(4) 75 percent  of the CS want to have an objective PER (which is not 
susceptible to political manipulation) 
(5) 90 percent of the officers confirmed that the objectives in the PER should be 
SMART? (Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, timed)  
(6) 75 percent concurred that there should be an assessment of the performance 
of job holders which takes into account of both what they have achieved and 
how they have achieved it. 
(7) 70 percent of the officers concurred that the assessment should be biannually 
ateast.  
(8) 80 percent of the officers said that only the direct superior should determine 
the work targets.  
(9) 65 percent of the officers confirmed that there should there be an evaluation 
from the lower management level also. 
The third set of results looked at how civil servants perceive the road forward in 
terms of civil service reforms.  The fascinating aspect of these survey results is that the 
civil servants were strongly in favour of a new performance evaluation system that links 
better performance to better jobs, but were very strongly convinced that politicians would 
oppose such a system.  Some of the key results from this section of the survey were: 
(1) 61 percent of the officers confirmed that there must be a link between 
performance and better postings. 
(2) 71 percent of the civil servants wanted such a system.  
(3) 80 percent of the officers said that the politicians would not want such a 
system. 
 Reforming a Broken System  59 
 
 
On the whole the result of the survey suggests some important conclusions: First, 
civil servants are extremely well aware of the failures of the present performance 
management system. In particular they are cognizant of what are the specific problems in 
the system, what failures these problems have led to and what are the solutions that are 
required to reform the system.  The second important conclusion is that the civil servants 
are overwhelmingly in favour of changing the system to make it a fairer and more 
accurate method of evaluating and rewarding performance. But the third key conclusion 
tempers these results in that they show that even though the civil servants are keen on 
reform, they recognise that pushing through reform in the present, highly politicised 
environment will be extremely difficult.  So the greatest obstacles may not come from the 
civil servants themselves but rather the politicians who benefit from the highly political 
system that exists presently that is  both highly subjective  and highly subject to 
manipulation.  
 
VI.  THE STRUCTURE OF A REVISED PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This section examines the current PER and for the purpose of the new revised 
PER, attempts to identify the areas in the current PER, (based on the analysis of the 
survey and international best practices discussed earlier) which tend to dilute its efficacy 
and make it susceptible to political manipulation. Part 1 of the current PER asks wide-
ranging questions, and focus on the background of the officer. And hence this section 
does not require any alterations. Part 2 of the PER contains questions which require 
alteration. The question in Section 11: 
(1) “Brief account of performance on the job during the period supported by 
statistical data where possible. Targets given and actual performance 
against such targets should be highlighted. Reasons for shortfall, if any, 
may also be stated.” 
This question needs to be reinvented as firstly: The part 2 in the form initiates the 
assessment of performance which has not been earlier agreed on by the reporting and 
reported party. Hence before this section, in the revised PER we add a section which 
includes a detailed timetable of events where the officer and the senior agree on targets, 
deadlines, budgets, time and cost overruns. This would be referred to in the proceeding 
section which will evaluate the agreed targets. Secondly the revised PER does not ask the 
above stated question, where the account of performance is descriptive, and use of 
statistical targets are optional and not mandatory. The question has been replaced by 
tangible, analytical and statistical analysis. Since the targets mentioned are not agreed 
beforehand, in objective analytical terms, it renders the above question inappropriate for 
accurate assessment of performance.  Hence the revised PER (presented in the Appendix) 
has replaced this question which is subjective and susceptible to political manipulation. 
The revised PER will ask questioned which will require analytical and statistical analysis.  
Part 111 of the current PER contains questions which require alteration, these are:  
Part 111, Q1: “Please comment on the officer’s performance on the job as 
given in Part II (2) with special reference to his knowledge of work, ability to 
plan, organise and supervise, analytical skills, competence to take decisions 
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and quality and quantity of output. How far was the officer able to achieve 
the targets? Comment on the officer’s contribution, with the help of statistical 
data, if any, in the overall performance of the organisation, do you agree with 
what has been stated in Part II (2)?” 
This question again is not based on any pre-agreed commitment on targets, and the 
answers are not based on any numerical numbering, but on general comments. If the 
targets are not agreed at the start, how can the achievement be analysed. The queries 
regarding knowledge, and planning and organisational skills and competence need to be 
structured and objective manner. The revised PER has altered this question and replaced 
it with a more objective and analytical query.  
(2) “Integrity (Morality, uprightness and honesty) 
(3) Pen picture including the officer’s strengths and weakness with focus on 
emotional stability, ability to work under pressure, communication skills 
and interpersonal effectiveness (weakness will not be considered as 
adverse entry unless intended to be treated as adverse)” 
These two questions are subjective and non-analytical and have been has been 
deleted, and been replaced by more objective and quantifiable questions in the new 
PER.  
 
Part 111,  
Q 6. Overall grading. 
 
Fitness for promotion  
Q7. Comment on the officer’s potential for holding a higher position and 
additional responsibilities. 
All three questions are currently ambiguous, and susceptible to manipulation. They 
need to be addressed from a more objective lens, where the answers need to be based on 
the achievement of targets and deadlines, and the quality of performance rendered. The 
analysis should also address areas where performance was unsatisfactory, and punitive 
measures in case of missed targets and time and cost overruns can be called for.  
The last section of the current PER calls for an assessment by any countersigning 
officer, who may or may not have adequate knowledge of the officer‟s work rendered. 
This is again open to manipulation. The new PER now asks the immediate junior to 
comment on the seniors work and performance. This would ensure that the senior involve 
the juniors in the organisation strategic goals and targets, it would ensure team work. It 
would also ensure that the senior remains accountable and does not excessively abuse the 
power given to him (although this might also allow for collusion of corruption). 
Hence the revised PER now asks assessments on the basis of objective, tangible, 
verifiable targets and timelines. It contains two separate parts. The first calls for an 
agreement between the superior and the officer on the targets, and deliverables, the 
budget involved and possible time and cost overruns. All the questions require answers in 
statistical detail. The performance evaluation in Part II of the PER is based on the 
agreement made in Part I between the officer and his senior. The targets are also shared 
with the junior below.  The second part to be viewed after 6 months of the agreement in 
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the first part) is the review of the target agreed in the first part. The use of objective, 
analytical terminology limits the susceptibility of the document to political manipulation.   
This makes the whole process of assessment more methodical, transparent, and 
communicative.  The targets discussed and finalised are also shared with the junior 
below. This further adds to the communication and accountability chapter. The revised 
PER also contains a section where the junior officers comments on the senior 
performance, this will go a long way in streamlining the performance of the seniors. The 
revised PER is devoid of subjective assessments which can be easily manipulative. It also 
contains most of the best international practices that the Pakistani civil service officers 
perceived to be instrumental in their revised PER. Some questions in the new PER:  
9.1 Targets to achieve: (Description of the target in objective, analytical and 
quantifiable terms).  
9.2  Value of the target: (The total costs and benefits of the target). 
9.3  Budget: (the budget and resources under the authority of the officer). 
9.4  Headcount responsibilities (Number of staff and their grade that reports 
to the officer). 
9.3  Timeline to achieve target: 
9.4  Objective:  what is the primary objective of the target?  
9.5 Deliverable? What will the verifiable deliverable at the time of 
completion? 
 The expected outcome that can be measured/assessed objectively?  
9.6 how and by whom will the deliverable be measured? How will the 
performance of achieving the target be measured?  
9.7 how and who will ensure that cost and time overruns don’t alter the 
efficiency of the target.  
9.8 will the target and deliverables decided be shared with the staff reporting 
to the officer?  
 
VII.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY ASPECTS 
In the previous sections we have looked at the shortcomings of the present civil 
servant performance evaluation system in Pakistan and have recommended ways of 
reforming the system. But one glaring issue that has been ignored is the political 
economy aspects of implementing potential reform. Based on the analysis above we have 
found that the present system has significant gaps and that these gaps are recognised by a 
majority of civil servants. But these civil servants also realise that one of the main 
reasons for the perpetuation of the present, highly subjective system is that it can be 
easily manipulated to serve the needs of politicians or other powerful stakeholders. The 
reasoning is simply: if there exists a purely objective system of evaluating civil service 
performance then powerful stakeholders will have less discretion in appointing people 
based on preferences (or through the complicated system of relationships that exist in 
Pakistan such as biradari or kinship) and will be forced to appoint civil servants based on 
merit and skill.  Also, an objective system of evaluating performance makes it difficult 
for stakeholders to use the threat of dismissal or transfers to force civil servants to follow 
their will, which has become commonplace now.   
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Other than these obvious obstacles to reforming the system, there are a number of 
more subtle (though no less powerful) reasons that reforming the system will be an uphill 
task:   
First, after the passage of the 18th amendment, many of the administrative and 
financial responsibilities have been shifted to the provinces (and there is a strong push 
towards devolution of power to local governments) which means much of the major 
decisions which were once taken at the federal level (and potentially less susceptible to 
corruption not because of greater honesty but because of significantly less access) are 
now taken at the provincial level and subject to greater pressure from affected 
stakeholders. This means that civil service reform will be resisted by a larger 
constituency of stakeholders that benefit from the present system.   
Second, politicians have slowly mastered the skill of choosing „loyal‟ bureaucrats 
and punishing „disloyal‟ or independent bureaucrats because of the significant expansion 
in the number of bureaucrats (which used to mean that the pool was smaller and thus 
exerted more power and unity) as well as because of the ability of politicians to go above 
the head of bureaucrats to higher level politicians or bureaucrats which has effectively 
reduced their power. This manipulation of the system becomes much more difficult in a 
system of evaluation based on objective criteria.   
Third, due to the nature of politics in Pakistan, most politicians, business elites and 
other powerful stakeholders have significantly reduced timelines to accomplish their 
specific objectives. This means that even if one made that argument that a fair 
performance management system for bureaucrats which effectively rewards bureaucrats 
(in terms of jobs, financial renumeration and training) is better for long run growth, most 
decision makers would ignore this argument since they believe that short run gains are far 
more important than long run results. So even if stakeholders are rational enough to 
realise that reforming the system will result in greater long run gains for everyone, they 
will avoid changing the system because the present system maximises their short run 
benefits.    
Fourth, there is a strong belief in society that bureaucrats are flawed: Either they 
are corrupt, or they are too powerful, or they are getting significantly more benefits than 
the rest of society, or they are not fulfilling their responsibilities. In this environment, 
there is either an explicit or implicit process of deliberately weakening bureaucrats, who 
are viewed as deserving of weakening or punishment. In such an atmosphere there is little 
appetite for significant reforms in the civil service performance management systems 
since people feel that it will only strengthen bureaucratic power.  Also, there is no 
movement in civil society towards reward bureaucrats for good performance because 
members of civil society either have a significantly opinion of bureaucrats or feel that 
they must adjust their objectives to suit those of the powerful elites as opposed to society 
as a whole.  In this environment, the present system is viewed as a way of weakening, 
controlling and punishing civil servants is viewed as optimal.   
Finally, the biggest issue is a lack of clarity amongst the bureaucrats and the elites 
about what should be the targets for bureaucrats and what constitutes good performance. 
This in turn makes it effectively impossible to quantify targets: So some bureaucrats may 
believe that good performance is defined by their own beliefs of what is best for society. 
Others may believe that good performance is simply obeying the instructions of elected 
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officials. There may be a section that believes that good performance is simply actions 
that lead to better and more influential positions.  Similarly, politicians may believe that 
good performing bureaucrats are those that simply obey instructions without any 
objections while business elites may believe that the best bureaucrats are those that 
simply do not interfere with the day to day running of the system.  In a situation where 
there is no agreement on what is good performance, there can be little progress in 
determining how to measure good performance.  So the first step must be a clear 
definition of the role and objectives of bureaucrats and then after this is decided how to 
measure if they have fulfilled these objectives.   
All of these factors reinforce the idea that civil service reform is critical yet 
challenging. The lack of a good performance management appraisal lowers bureaucratic 
capacity. The low bureaucratic capacity tends to create a vicious circle.
3
 The relationship 
between the bureaucracy and politicians remains complex. However the relationship 
between the political and bureaucratic sphere remains critical for successful reform 
[Schneider (2003)] therefore all initiatives that works towards promoting the civil service 
reform need to be cognizant that ensuring meritocratic appointments and providing 
incentives for performance for bureaucrats will essential for their improved performance, 
yet difficult for the politicians to abide by as it would require the political elite to 
relinquish their power.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The paper shows that the current performance evaluation system used to measure 
the performance of Pakistani bureaucrats is inadequate and obsolete. The system not only 
fails in establishing an objective criteria for assessment and promotion but also gives 
incentives for political alignment.    
The implications of this research is that there needs to be an immediate re-
evaluation of the present performance management systems of Pakistani bureaucrats 
which makes it an objective measure of bureaucratic performance which is not 
susceptible to political interference.    
We conducted a novel survey of senior civil servants which informs of a 
significant disconnect between the present performance evaluation system and the actual 
performance of civil servants. This in turn has led to significantly negative perceptions of 
the present performance evaluation system, a lack of incentive for efficient performance 
and an increase in incentives for political alignment for the civil servants.  But perhaps 
most importantly the survey shows that the majority of civil servants would like 
significant changes in the present performance management system to make it a more 
accurate representation of actual civil service performance outcomes. This paper offers an 
alternative, an objective document which is can be a motivator for performance and is 
also less susceptible to political manipulation. 
But these recommendations must be tempered with the realisation that the present 
system has been established not to optimise bureaucratic performance (or for that matter 
for furthering development outcomes) but rather to sustain the present system of 
 
3It weakens incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, and furthermore makes it more 
difficult for politicians to persuade bureaucrats to take actions that politician‟s desire [Huber and McCarty 
(2004)]. 
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patronage and power.  So these performance evaluation system reforms have to be 
accompanied by an effort to convince the political elites that an independent and 
motivated bureaucracy will lead to more winners than losers.  
 
APPENDIX 1 
Pakistani PER (The Original) 
 
FOR OFFICERS IN BPS 19 & 20        S-121-G(i) 
 
CONFIDENTIAL       
 
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN 
  
Ministry / Division /  Service / Group  
Department / Office    
 
 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT 
 
FOR THE PERIOD   
Department / Office   
 
 
PART – I 
 
(TO BE FILLED IN BY THE OFFICER REPORTED UPON) 
 
1.  Name (in block Letters) 
 
2.  Personal Number 
 
3.  Date of Birth 
      
4.  Date of Entry in Service 
       
5.  Post held during the period (with BPS) 
       
6.  Academic Qualifications 
       
7.  Knowledge of Languages 
       
(Please indicate proficiency in speaking (S), reading (R) and writing (W)) 
   
8.  Training received during the evaluation period 
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Name of Course attended 
  
Duration with dates 
  
Name of Institution and Country 
   
9.  Period served  
 
(i) In present post  (ii) Under the reporting officer  
               
 
PART – II 
 
(TO BE FILLED IN BY THE OFFICER REPORTED UPON) 
 
1.  Job description 
       
2.  Brief account of performance on the job during the period supported by statistical data 
where possible. Targets given and actual performance against such targets should be 
highlighted. Reasons for shortfall, if any, may also be stated. 
        
 
PART – III 
 
(EVALUATION BY THE REPORTING OFFICER) 
 
1.  Please comment on the officer‟s performance on the job as given in Part II (2) with 
special reference to his knowledge of work, ability to plan, organise and supervise, 
analytical skills, competence to take decisions and quality and quantity of output. 
How far was the officer able to achieve the targets? Comment on the officer‟s 
contribution, with the help of statistical data, if any, in the overall performance of the 
organisation, Do you agree with what has been stated in Part II (2)? 
 
2.  Integrity (Morality, uprightness and honesty) 
      
3. Pen picture including the officer‟s strengths and weakness with focus on emotional stability, 
ability to work under pressure, communication skills and interpersonal effectiveness 
(weakness will not be considered as adverse entry unless intended to be treated as adverse) 
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4. Area and level of Professional expressional expertise with suggestions for future 
posting 
      
5.  Training and development needs 
      
6.  Overall grading 
      
Fitness for promotion    
 
7. Comment on the officer‟s potential for holding a higher position and additional 
responsibilities 
      
  





Signature     ______________________  
  
Date       ______________ 
 
 
PART – IV 
 
(REMARKS OF THE COUNTERSIGNING OFFICER) 
 
1.  How often have you seen the work of the officer reported upon? 
      
2. How well do you know the officer? If you disagree with the assessment of the 
reposting officer, please give reasons 
       
3.  Overall grading 
      
Recommendation for promotion  
  
4. (Comment on the officer‟s potential for holding a higher position and additional 
responsibilities) 
       
5.  Evaluation of the quality of assessment made by the reporting officer 
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Date       ______________ 
 
 
PART – V 
 
(REMARKS OF THE SECOND COUNTERSIGNING OFFICER (IF ANY) 
 
 








Date       ______________ 
 
 
Pakistani Performance Agreement and Evaluation Form. (The revised PER) 
 
FOR OFFICERS IN BPS 19 & 20        
CONFIDENTIAL       
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN 
 
Ministry / Division /  Service / Group  
Department / Office   
 
Performance  Agreement and Evaluation Report.  
FOR THE PERIOD   
Department / Office   
1. Name (in block Letters) 
2. Personal Number 
3. Date of Birth 
4. Date of Entry in Service 
5. Post held during the period (with BPS) 
6. Academic Qualifications 
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7. Knowledge of Languages 
8. Training received during the evaluation period 
Name of Course attended 
Duration with dates 
Name of Institution and Country 
 
PART – 1 
Performance Agreement on Targets/Deliverables 
(to be filled at the start of a new post) 
 
9.Present post:   
 (i) In present post  (ii) Under the reporting officer  
 
9.1 Targets to achieve: (Description of the target in objective, analytical and quantifiable 
terms)  
9.2 Value of the target: (the total costs and benefits of the target) 
9.3 Budget: (the budget and resources under the authority of the officer) 
9.4 Headcount responsibilities (Number of staff and their grade that reports to the 
officer) 
9.3 Timeline to achieve target: 
9.4 Objective:  what is the primary objective of the target?  
9.5 Deliverable? What will the verifiable deliverable at the time of completion? The 
expected outcome that can be measured/assessed objectively?  
9.6 how and by whom will the deliverable be measured? How will the performance of 
achieving the target be measured?  
9.7  how and who will ensure that cost and time overruns don‟t alter the efficiency of the 
target.  
9.8  will the target and deliverables decided be shared with the staff reporting to the 
officer?  
 
PART – II 
Performance Evaluation Form: 
(TO BE FILLED IN BY THE OFFICER REPORTED UPON) 
 
9.1 Targets achieved: (Description of the target achieved in objective, quantifiable and 
analytical terms).  
9.2) Value of the target: (the total costs and benefits generated from the 
target/deliverable).  
9.3 was the budget fully utilised? : (an examination of the budget and resources under 
the authority of the officer).  
9.3 Timeline: Target achieved in envisioned time?  
9.4 Objective:  Was the objective achieved?  
9.5 Deliverable? What are the testable deliverables at the time of completion?  
9.6 How are the deliverable be measured?  
9.7 How is the performance of achieving the target be assessed? What yardstick?  
9.7 were they any cost and time overruns?  
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PART – III 
(EVALUATION BY THE REPORTING OFFICER) 
1. Please comment on the officer‟s performance on the job as given in Part II (2) with 
special reference to his competence to take effective decisions regarding the targets 
achieved?  
2.  Did the officers meet all his expected targets?  
3. Comment on the officer‟s contribution, only with the help of statistical data, in the 
overall performance of the organisation? 
4. Could the officer have performed more efficiently? How?  
5. What training would me most appropriate to the officer‟s skill sets?   
6. The officer is best suited for posting in which department?  
7. Is the officer ready for the next grade?  
8. If yes, why? 
9. If no, why?  
 





Signature     ______________________  
 
Date       ______________ 
                
 
PART – IV 
(To be filled by immediate junior, who reports to the officer) 
1. How often have you seen the work of the officer reported upon? 
2. Did you work with your senior in completing the target/deliverables assigned to him? 
3. What have you learnt during the time you worked with your officer?  
4. How well do you know the officer? If you agree/disagree with the assessment of the 
reposting officer, please give reasons. 
5. Recommendation for promotion, (Comment on the officer‟s potential for holding a 
higher position and additional responsibilities). 
6. Evaluation of the quality of assessment made by the reporting officer. 
 







Date       ______________ 
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PART – V 
(REMARKS OF THE SECOND COUNTERSIGNING OFFICER (IF ANY) 
(the remarks should be used as much as statistical and analytical language as possible, 
please refer to  Part 1, and comment on the target and deliverables only) 
 
 









Date       ______________ 
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